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Audience Psychology and Censorship 




Abstract: In Republic X the “problem of the irrational part” is this: Greek tragedy 
interacts with non-reasoning elements of the soul, affecting audiences in ways that 
undermine their reasoned views about virtue and value. I suggest that the common 
construal of Socrates’s critique of Greek tragedy is inadequate, in that it belies key 
elements of Plato’s audience psychology; specifically, (1) the crucial role of the spir-
ited part and (2) the audience’s cognitive contribution to spectatorship. I argue that 
Socrates’s emphasis on the audience’s cognitive contribution to spectatorship allows 
him to anticipate a non-authoritarian solution to the problem of the irrational part.
In Plato’s Republic Socrates infamously proposes a censorship program of stunning magnitude and ruthless scope, extending from Greek drama and 
literature to architecture, pottery, and even children’s games. Socrates bans or 
severely censors the entire Greek literary cannon. Plato’s interest in authoritarian 
“cultural catharsis” is real and enduring, resurfacing prominently in the Laws.1
In this paper I do not defend censorship. Instead, I point to the problem that 
ultimately motivates Plato’s censorship program—what I call “the problem 
of the irrational part.” Put simply, the problem is this: tragedy interacts with 
non-reasoning elements of the human psyche, affecting audiences in ways that 
undermine their reasoned views about value and virtue. In what follows, I focus 
on the neglected final book of the Republic (Republic X), wherein Socrates recruits 
his tripartite psychology to remake the case for censorship—in effect banning 
comedy and tragedy and banishing the “leader of the tragedians,” Homer.
In Republic X, Socrates charges tragedy with appealing to the irrational 
(ἀνόητον, ἀλόγιστον) part of the soul—i.e., spirit (τὸ θυµοειδής) and appetite 
2  Sarah Jansen
(τὸ ἐπιθυµητικόν) that oppose (rather than harmonize with) reason.2 The ratio-
nal part (τὸ λογιστικόν) of the soul, which forms beliefs on the basis of reason, 
generates desires for truth, learning and wisdom (581b6–10). In contrast, appetite 
and spirit form beliefs on the basis of appearances.3 Whereas appetite generates 
desires for bodily satisfaction and money (581a1); spirit generates desires for 
control, victory and high repute (581a10), becoming angry when these aims are 
frustrated (606d and 439e).4 As regards tragedy, the irrational part (comprised 
of spirit and appetite) “leads us to  dwell on our misfortunes and to lamentation” 
and “can never get enough of these things” (604d6–8). In lamenting for the tragic 
hero, Greek audience members strengthen their irrational appetite for physically 
expressing grief (605d, 606a)—an appetite better kept in check, lest the citizenry 
prize pleasurable histrionics more than practical reason (607a).
However, this common construal of Plato’s critique of tragedy is inadequate. 
It belies key elements of Plato’s audience psychology; in particular, the focus on 
the audience’s cognitive contribution to spectatorship. In what follows, I sketch 
how, for Plato, tragedy interacts with Greek theatergoers’ spirited part to produce 
illusions of virtue and value, which are instrumental in conditioning Greek au-
diences to adopt false beliefs about virtue and value.5 I end by suggesting that 
Socrates’s emphasis on the audience’s contribution to spectatorship allows him 
to anticipate a non-authoritarian solution to the problem of the irrational part.
I. Axiological Illusion
According to the theory of audience response that Socrates articulates in Repub-
lic X, tragedy’s “illusory images” (εἴδολα, φαντάσµατα, φαινόµενα) trigger 
the spectator’s appetite for lamentation.6 Not unlike painters who produce visual 
illusions with their paintings, Greek tragic and epic poets produce axiological 
illusions with their poetry—i.e., false appearances of virtue and value. Accord-
ing to Socrates, tragedy’s depictions of heroes lamenting death, dishonor or 
disenfranchisement produce the appearance that the loss of external goods is 
terrible (δεινόν) and that lamentation is a “worthy” (ἄξιον) response (387d–e, 
388d). In effect, tragedy produces the illusion that a fine man (i.e., the hero) 
suffers a terrible misfortune. However, according to Socrates, only having a bad 
soul is truly terrible for a human being. Personal and material attachments are 
insignificant in comparison to “virtue” or “excellence” (ἀρετή), which Socrates 
analyzes as soul health. Moreover, a fine and noble individual, recognizing this 
fact, is not histrionic, irascible and variable (ποικίλος); having the least need 
of anyone or anything external to himself, he is “most self-sufficient in living 
well” (387d11), in contrast to the so-called heroes that populate epic and tragic 
poetry. The loss of external goods does not incite him to imperil his soul health 
by excessively lamenting. Also, because his desires are in line with reason, his 
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appetites are few and simple. For this reason, the truly excellent human be-
ing is not variable, but “remains pretty well the same” (604e1). Undisturbed 
by violent appetites or emotions, he employs practical reason in pursuit of 
a unified vision of what is truly valuable in human life (i.e., soul health).7 
Hence, given this picture of virtue, it is hardly surprising that Socrates censors 
Achilles’s expressions of grief in the Iliad. Achilles’s excessive, self-indulgent 
grief handicaps his practical reason and imperils his soul health; he behaves 
unreasonably and viciously in defiling Hector’s corpse. According to Socrates, 
such depictions produce the axiological illusion that external goods are more 
valuable than virtue or soul health.
I do not defend Socrates’s revaluation of values, which places an unusually 
high premium on virtue in contrast to external goods. Nor do I wish to put pres-
sure on the (rather odd) idea that embodied existence and friends are “external 
goods,” on par with material goods and honor. I am more interested in Plato’s 
general model of audience response and the role of irrational part therein. My 
question is this: how does tragedy interact with and strengthen the irrational 
part of the soul? So, having canvassed the kind of axiological illusion tragedy 
purportedly produces, I now turn to discuss the heretofore-unappreciated role 
of the Greek theatergoer’s spirited part in accepting and creating tragedy’s axi-
ological appearances.
II. Spirit and Axiological Illusion
In this section I argue that spirit (not appetite) is susceptible to tragedy’s illusions 
of virtue and value. This is because spirit (not appetite) forms appearance-based 
beliefs about virtue and value. In Socrates’s view, the Greek poet, lacking knowl-
edge of “what makes men better,” imitates “images of virtue” (εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς) 
or whatever appears “fine” (καλόν) to the ignorant majority (599c–d, 600e, 602b). 
Tellingly, the spirited element of the irrational part (not the appetitive element) 
makes assessments of fineness or nobleness.8 According to Socrates, when a man 
believes someone has wronged him, his spirit is angry; battling for “the seemingly 
just” (τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ) and undertaking “noble actions” (τῶν γενναίων), 
his spirit tolerates hunger and cold until it is victorious or placated (440c–d). In 
other words, spirit generates moral indignation and corresponding judgments 
about fineness and shamefulness (440b–e).9 Importantly, spirit’s judgments as 
regards the fine and the shameful are deficient insofar as they are insensitive to 
calculations of benefit and detriment. So, citing Odysseus’s reasoned resistance 
of his angry impulse to punish Penelope’s maids, Socrates concludes, “For here 
Homer clearly represents the part that has calculated about better and worse 
as different from the part [spirit] that is angry without calculation” (441b6–7). 
Spirit tends to “boil over,” such that reason must calm it and call it to heel like a 
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shepherd would his dog (440c–d). Unlike reason, spirit’s judgments of fineness 
and shamefulness arise from whatever appears fine or shameful to it; spirit fights 
for the “seemingly” (δοκοῦντι) just (440c6).
It should come as no surprise that spirit plays an important role in the audi-
ence psychology of Republic X. After all, in Books II–III Socrates advocates using 
music and poetry to soften whatever “spirit” (θυµοειδές) the young guardians 
possess, tempering it like hot iron and making it useful (411a8–10). Socrates 
supposes that Homeric poetry has the opposite effect on youths, as evidenced by 
his sustained critique of Homeric depictions of Achilles.10 According to Socrates, 
Homer’s Achilles is irascible, insubordinate, headstrong, arrogant, etc. (389e–390a, 
391a–c)—in short, the exemplar of “thumos run amok.”11 Adolescents must not 
imitate Achilles or similar characters, lest such imitations “become part of nature 
and settle into habits of gesture, voice, and thought” (395d1–2). In other words, 
in providing irascible and savage role models for imitation, popular Greek poetry 
hardens and animalizes the spirited part of the adolescent soul.12 In contrast, 
exposure to likenesses of virtue (in music and poetry) teaches a guardian’s devel-
oping spirit to recognize truly “fine things” (καλά) and truly “shameful things” 
(αἰσχρά) (401e–402a).
What about tragedy’s illusions of terribleness? Does spirit form appearance-
based beliefs about terribleness. In answering this question, it is important to 
note that the theatergoer’s judgment that the tragic hero’s personal misfortune 
is terrible is a value judgment. According to Socrates, we “follow” the hero to the 
extent that we lament with the hero and “take his sufferings seriously” (605d2), 
which undoubtedly requires sharing the hero’s assessment that he “fares badly” 
(κακῶς πεπραγέναι) with regard to material loss or death—i.e., that he has 
lost something of presumed worth.13
Interestingly, unlike appetite, spirit is said to be capable valuing. So, even 
though the oligarchic man is ruled by his appetitive desire for money, his spirit 
(not his appetite) “values” (τιµᾶν) and “admires” (θαυµάζειν) money, “being 
ambitious to” (φιλοτιµεῖσθαι) acquire money (553c2–d6). Nevertheless, un-
reasoning spirit’s value judgments are deficient, in that they are not grounded in 
rational calculations of worth. Rather, spirit’s value judgments arise from whatever 
appears valuable, admirable or fine. (Consider again undercover Odysseus and the 
apparent worth of immediately punishing the maids.) Hence, spirit is uniquely 
susceptible to tragedy’s appearances of terribleness (analyzed as appearances of 
what is valuable in human life).
Lastly, Socrates’s analysis of courage and cowardice directly implicates spirit as 
the source of appearance-based judgments of terribleness. According to Socrates, 
a soul is cowardly if spirit fails to follow reason in making the correct assess-
ments about what is and is not terrible (442b–c)—e.g., if spirit judges (contra 
reason) that death is terrible. Given that the apparent terribleness of death is one 
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of tragedy’s chief axiological illusions, the spirited element of the irrational part 
(not the appetitive element) is susceptible to tragedy’s illusions of terribleness.14
However, the spirited part of Greek theatergoers is not only susceptible to trag-
edy’s axiological illusions; it is also instrumental in creating tragedy’s axiological 
illusions. For Plato, the irrational part of the soul does not merely believe tragedy’s 
illusions; it also co-creates tragedy’s illusions.15 Tragedy’s axiological illusions are 
the “joint progeny” of the drama and the viewer’s irrational part. Tragedy “has 
intercourse with” (προσοµιλεῖ) the irrational part (603a9–11). Each is a “cour-
tesan” (ἑταίρα) to the other. Tragedy is an inferior thing (φαύλη) which, “having 
intercourse with” (συγγιγνοµένη) with an inferior thing (i.e., the irrational 
part),  “begets” (γεννᾷ) inferior offspring (603b3–4). Moreover, the analogy with 
shadow painting (σκιαγραφία) supports this point. According to Socrates, the 
shadow painter appeals to the irrational part of the soul by producing optical il-
lusions. In particular, the shadow painter uses shading and coloring to produce 
the visual illusion of depth within the field of the painting, thereby creating the 
illusion that apparently nearby objects are large and apparently faraway objects 
are small (602c).16 Importantly, this optical illusion is the joint offspring of the 
irrational part of the soul and the painting. It is precisely because the perceiver is 
prone, in virtue of her irrational part, to view certain two-dimensional combina-
tions of shades and colors as three-dimensional and to view seemingly nearby 
objects as large and seemingly faraway objects as small that shadow painting is 
able to produce an optical illusion and a corresponding false belief.
Why suppose that spirit is complicit in constructing tragedy’s axiological illu-
sions? Answering this question requires examining the character of the spectator’s 
spirited part. According to Socrates, the audience of Greek tragedy consists of the 
vicious majority and “decent men” (ἐπιεικεῖς) (602a, 605c). The decent man is 
ethically flawed, in that he undergoes psychic conflict (στάσις). For example, 
when misfortune befalls the decent man, he experiences an appetitive desire to 
lament and an opposing (rational) desire to keep quiet (603d–604e). This inner 
opposition constitutes psychic conflict, as opposed to mere opposition, due to 
the manner of its resolution. When in the presence of others, the decent man’s 
spirit, fearing shame, “fights” (µάχεται) and overpowers his appetitive desire to 
lament (603e–604a); and when the man is alone, his appetitive desire to lament 
overpowers his rational inclination to keep quiet (603e–604a).17 In contrast, in the 
harmonious soul of the fully virtuous individual psychic opposition is resolved 
peacefully; reason “persuades” appetite and/or spirit to “follow” it.18 Moreover, 
the harmonious soul is less likely to experience psychic opposition to begin with, 
because its appetitive and spirited parts are trained to harmonize with reason 
(401e1–402a4). Thus, the decent Greek (whom tragedy appeals to) possesses a 
propensity to psychic conflict, which is symptomatic of his reason-opposed (RO) 
appetite and spirit. Being prone to perceive (and believe) that death, dishonor 
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and disenfranchisement are huge in terribleness, his spirited part judges (contra 
reason) that the loss of external goods is terrible. (Similarly, the irrational part is 
prone to perceive (and believe) that nearby objects are huge in size.) By projecting 
its own assessments of value onto the performance, the spirited part contributes 
to the construction of tragedy’s axiological illusions.
Whereas the irrational part is susceptible to optical illusions in virtue of certain 
facts about the agent’s physiology, the spirited part is susceptible to axiological 
illusions in virtue of certain facts about the agent’s psychology. Specifically, spirit, 
qua the honor-loving (φιλότιµον) part of the soul, is naturally susceptible to 
culturally endorsed axiological appearances—conformity to which earns spirit 
honor.19 According to Socrates, Greek poets reflect whatever (erroneously) ap-
pears fine to the ignorant majority (602a–b). In other words, the heroes of Greek 
tragedy reflect (and reinforce) cultural ideals, which necessarily appear correct to 
spirit—shaped as it is by Greek culture. Even the “decent” man’s spirited part—
having been steeped in Hesiod, Homer and the like—is prone to perceive tragic 
heroes as “κάλοι.” In this way, the Greek theatergoer’s spirited part is actually 
complicit in constructing tragedy’s illusions of virtue.20
III. Appetite in Plato’s Audience Psychology
The previous discussion might seem to suggest that appetite plays little or no role 
in Plato’s audience psychology. However, RO appetite (i.e., appetite at it occurs 
in the inharmonious soul) plays a crucial role in Plato’s audience psychology. 
In satisfying RO appetite’s hunger to physically express RO spirit’s “thumoedic 
perspective” on the tragic hero’s misfortune, tragedy strengthens the motivational 
force of the thumoedic perspective. Moreover, tragedy achieves this effect by entic-
ing theatergoers to relax their reason in pursuit of the pleasure of sympathetically 
inhabiting the thumoeidic perspective—the repeated enjoyment of which condi-
tions audiences to occupy the thumoeidic perspective in real life, with regard to 
their own misfortunes.21 Socrates remarks:
I suppose that few are able to figure out that enjoyment of other people’s suf-
ferings is necessarily transferred to our own and that the pitying part, if it is 
nourished and strengthened on the sufferings of others, won’t be easily held 
in check when we ourselves suffer (606b5–8).
[λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἶµαι ὀλίγοις τισὶν µέτεστιν ὅτι ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη 
ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα· θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν 
τὸ ἐλεινὸν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πάθεσι κατέχειν.]
The “pitying part” (τὸ ἐλεινόν) is the irrational part of the soul, which is the 
source of the decent man’s disposition to view his own misfortunes as terrible 
and to desire to lament in response. Plato’s point is that this disposition is both 
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self and other regarding. So, if it is strengthened with regard to others, then it 
is strengthened with regard to oneself. This is because weeping for the hero (on 
behalf of his misfortune) and bewailing one’s own misfortune both involve (a) 
the belief that the loss of external goods is terrible and (b) the satisfaction of 
the desire to physically express this belief. To succumb to this belief and its con-
comitant appetitive desire is to strengthen both the belief and the desire, whether 
applied to another or oneself. In sum, Plato charges Greek tragedy with nurturing 
the histrionic tendencies of the populace by strengthening the motivational force 
of the thumoeidic perspective and its concomitant appetite for lamentation.22
IV. Conclusion
This concludes my sketch of the critique of tragedy in Republic X. I want to end by 
suggesting that Socrates anticipate a non-authoritarian solution to the problem of 
the irrational part. Completing his Book X critique of tragedy, Socrates considers 
how we, who do not occupy the kallipolis, ought to respond to corruptive poetry:
whenever we listen to it, we’ll repeat the argument we have just now put forward 
like an incantation so as to preserve ourselves from slipping back into that 
childish passion for poetry which the majority of people have. And we’ll go on 
chanting that such poetry is not to be taken seriously or treated as a serious 
undertaking with some kind of hold on truth, but that anyone who is anxious 
about the constitution within him must be careful when he hears it and must 
continue to believe what we have said about it. (608a1–b1)
In other words, Socrates exhorts us to not relax our reason in the theater. It is 
precisely because Plato’s theory of audience response emphasizes the audience’s 
complicity in constructing axiological appearances that it can accommodate 
the audience’s doxastic responsibility. In other words, it is up to us, qua active 
contributors to media’s axiological appearances, to guard our souls against false 
appearances and beliefs. Doxastic responsibility (of the sort Socrates recom-
mends) requires more than mere rational engagement with the drama; it requires 
the theatergoer to forgo the pleasure of lamentation so as to retain the rational 
perspective throughout the drama.23 Such rational disengagement protects the 
theatergoer against strengthening his reason-opposed thumoeidic perspective.
Mightn’t a similar appeal to doxastic responsibility be made in our own time, 
with regard to contemporary popular media? Consider Oliver Stone’s film Natu-
ral Born Killers, which has been widely criticized for sensationalizing violence. 
Stone defends the film, on the grounds that it prompts viewers to reflect that 
“violence is all around us; it’s in nature and it’s in every one of us, and we have 
to acknowledge it and come to grips with it.”24 However, even if we grant Stone 
this point, the problem of the irrational part remains: Natural Born Killers might 
trigger our reason-opposed violent urges (making us “aware” of them), but at the 
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expense of empowering them. Plato’s criticism of tragedy runs along these same 
lines: despite whatever moral reflection epic and tragic poetry encourage, Greek 
theatergoers nevertheless run the risk of strengthening their histrionic tenden-
cies.25 This realization is the first step toward doxastic responsibility.
NOTES
1. See especially Republic II–III and Laws II.
2. Most commentators identify the irrational part with spirit and appetite. See, for 
example, Adam, The Republic of Plato, 406; Moss, What Is Imitative Poetry and Why 
Is It Bad?, 439; and Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle, 
65. This interpretation is supported by the language that Socrates uses in connec-
tion with the irrational part. According to Socrates, the irrational part “hungers for 
the satisfactions of weeping and sufficiently lamenting, being by nature such as to 
have appetites (ἐπιθυµεῖν) for these things” (604d5–6, translation in Moss, What is 
Imitative Poetry and Why Is It Bad, 439). Furthermore, Socrates calls the irrational 
part “multicolored” (ποικίλον) (605a5)—a term earlier applied to the appetitive part 
(588c7). The irrational part also possesses qualities associated with the spirited part. 
For instance, by appealing to the irrational part of the soul, imitative poetry not only 
“nurtures and waters” appetites, but also anger (θυµός)—the source (or subject) 
of which is the spirited part (τὸ θυµοειδής) (606d & 439e). That imitative poetry 
appeals to spirit, in addition to appetite,  receives further confirmation at 604e–605a. 
There, Socrates claims that imitative poets imitate the “irritable” (ἀγανακτητικόν) 
character and, in so doing, appeal to the “irritable part” (τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν) of the 
soul. Tellingly, Socrates earlier associates spirit with “irritability” (δυςκολία) (590a8).
3. The resistance to identifying the irrational part with appetite or appetite and spirit 
is rooted in a particular account  of appetite, according to which appetites are blind 
impulses or “good-independent desires”—i.e., desires that are not constituted by 
the belief that their object is in some sense good. Murphy puts it succinctly: “τὸ 
ἐπιθυµητικόν is a source of original attractions and repulsions, blind impulses to 
obtain or avoid” (Murphy, The Interpretation of Plato’s Republic, 42). And Irwin calls 
appetitive desires “good-independent” (Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, 208–9). Since,   on this 
construal of appetite, appetites do not involve beliefs, it follows that appetite is neces-
sarily distinct from the irrational, “illusion believing” part of the soul. However, the 
“blind impulse” view of appetite has been challenged in recent years. Commentators 
increasingly point out that the Republic attributes beliefs, including beliefs about 
the good, to appetite (571d1, 505d11–e1, 560b7–c3, 554c12–d3). See, for example, 
Singpurwalla, Soul Division and Mimesis in Republic X, 291–3; Carone, Akrasia in 
the Republic: Does Plato Change his Mind?, 107–48; and Lorenz, The Brute Within: 
Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle, 59–73.
4. Socrates alludes to the possibility of “parts in between” other parts of the soul (443d7), 
twice remarking that the tripartite theory of the soul is not a precise answer to the 
question of how many parts the soul contains (435c9–d8, 504b1–c4).
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5. Although scholars recognize that spirit plays a role in Plato’s audience psychology, 
this role has not been well articulated. See Singpurwalla, Soul Division and Mimesis 
in Republic X, 297.
6. The terms “εἴδολα,” “φαντάσµατα,” and “φαινόµενα” often denote deceptive or 
spurious images. See Janaway, Images of Excellence: Plato’s Critique of the Arts, 110–11; 
see also Halliwell, Republic X with Translation and Commentary, 118–19. Note the 
complete absence in Book X of the neutral term for “image” (i.e., “εἰκών”), employed 
in the divided line passage (509d–511e).
7. In a certain sense, Socrates’s critique of excessive, self-indulgent lamentation is 
compelling, especially when placed in its historical context. To flourish amid social 
and political upheaval, war and plague would have required resilience.
8. Citing parallels with the Protagoras, Moss argues that tragedy appeals primarily to 
appetite, which judges goodness and badness by the false standard of pleasure. See 
Moss, Pleasure and Illusion in Plato, 503–35; see also Moss, What is Imitative Poetry 
and Why is it Bad?, 415–44.
9. Spirit never sides with appetite against reason (440b), unless corrupted as a result 
of bad upbringing (441a). Thumos is much more likely to side with reason against 
appetite (440e).
10. From 379d to 391e there are sixteen references to Achilles or his speeches, fourteen 
of which are critical.
11. See Hobbs, Plato and the Hero, 199–209. Hobbs emphasizes the similarities between 
Achilles (as depicted by Socrates) and the timocratic man, in whom spirit has “run 
amok” (in virtue of not being properly subordinated to reason). To cite just one ex-
ample, Socrates ascribes materialism to both Achilles and the timocratic man (390e, 
391c, 549b).
12. The reason that this is not explicitly stated in the text is that Socrates has not yet 
distinguished between the three parts of the soul.
13. At 603c Socrates claims that imitative poetry imitates human beings in action, who 
believe that they fare well or badly in these actions and who experience either plea-
sure or pain as a result. From this it can be inferred that the tragic hero, whom the 
imitative poet imitates, believes that he fares badly with regard to his misfortune.
14. To be sure, Socrates acknowledges that tragic heroes lament other things—e.g., the 
loss of money or prized possessions (387e, 603e). This might seem to suggest that 
appetite, qua the “money-loving” part of the soul, is susceptible to tragedy’s illusion 
that the loss of money is terrible. However, as we have seen, it is the spirited part of 
the money-lover’s soul that values money.
15. See Harte, Republic X and the Role of the Audience in Art, 69–96.
16. Hence, it is because shadow painting exploits a “weakness in our nature”—i.e., our 
propensity to be deceived by colors and by distances (602c)—that shadow painting 
has “powers that are little short of magical” (602d), deceiving a part of the soul “which 
cannot distinguish the large and the small but believes that the same things are large 
at one time and small at another” (605c1–3).
17. While Socrates does not explicitly say that spirit fights and overpowers the decent 
man’s appetitive desire to lament, this can be inferred. Since spirit, qua the honor-
10  Sarah Jansen
loving part of the soul, desires honor, it follows social custom (νόµος) in opposing 
the decent man’s appetitive desire to shamefully lament in the presence of his equals. 
However, when the decent man is alone, spirit does not oppose this appetitive urge to 
lament, since the man’s reputation is no longer at risk. In contrast, reason, if opera-
tive, always opposes the decent man’s appetitive urge to lament, since the rational 
disinclination to lament arises not from the desire to conform to social custom, but 
rather from the calculation that the present event is not all that bad in the grand 
scheme of things and should be met with practical reason, not lamentation (604b–c). 
Presumably, when alone the decent man is overcome by his appetitive desire to la-
ment, because reason requires spirit, its watchdog, to overpower the appetitive desire 
to lament. See 440a–c for the view that spirit, like a loyal dog, naturally allies itself 
with reason. For a good discussion of the “decent man,” see Ferrari, The Philosopher’s 
Antidote, 107–9.
18. In Book IX, Socrates juxtaposes the peaceful rule of reason—in which appetite 
and spirit “follow knowledge and argument,” having been tamed and cultivated by 
reason—to the forceful rule of appetite and spirit (586d–587a, 588b–589b). Also, 
in Book VIII the appetite-ruled oligarch is faulted for resorting to “compulsion and 
fear” to keep his better appetites in control of his worse ones, instead of “persuading 
and taming” his appetites with “arguments” (554c–d). The clear implication is that 
while the appetitive part rules by means of overpowering the other parts, the rational 
part rules by caring for the community of the parts and by persuading them (via 
non-rational means) to follow it.
19. See Hobbs, Plato and the Hero.
20. It is at this point that the analogy with painting and visual illusions breaks down. 
Whereas spirit is prone to certain sorts of axiological illusions in virtue of its up-
bringing, the irrational part is not prone to certain visual illusions in virtue of its 
upbringing.
21. The evidence we have suggests that Greek audiences did not cultivate ‘aesthetic dis-
tance.’ Rather, Greek tragedy was an emotionally charged form of mass entertainment. 
For a good discussion of this topic, see Nehamas, Plato and the Mass Media, 214–34.
22. There is also a worry that tragedy strengthens the perceptual force of the thumoeidic 
perspective—i.e., one’s tendency to apply or occupy the thumoedic perspective. So, 
according to Socrates, poetry’s depictions of heroes lamenting cause young people to 
“groan and lament at even insignificant misfortunes” (388d7). The worry is that the 
repeated, pleasurable experience of occupying the tragic hero’s thumoedic perspective 
conditions decent Greek theatergoers to apply the thumoeidic perspective to formerly 
ambiguous stimuli (e.g., the loss of a half drachma).
23. See Ferrari, The Philosopher’s Antidote.
24. See Silet (ed.), Oliver Stone: Interviews, 156.
25. Smith argues that the Iliad is a critique of Achilles’s character and Greek notions 
of virtue more generally (Smith, Some Thoughts About the Origins of “Greek Ethics,” 
3–20. So, the Iliad may be plausibly interpreted as a critique of Achilles’s thumoedic 
worldview. After all, there is not a happy ending for Achilles, much less the heroes of 
Greek tragedy, whose ἁµαρτίαι are testaments to their shortcomings.
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